Abstract: This paper deals with the use of Bayesian networks to compute system reliability. The reliability analysis problem is described and the usual methods for quantitative reliability analysis are presented within a case study. Some drawbacks that justify the use of Bayesian networks are identified. The basic concepts of the Bayesian networks application to reliability analysis are introduced and a model to compute the reliability for the case study is presented.
a knowledge point of view. Shenoy [35] has shown the advantages and drawbacks of these tools and proved their equivalence under some conditions. The probabilistic representation of uncertainty have been successfully employed in reliability analyses but also criticized for inducing an appearance of more knowledge with respect to the existing uncertainty than is really present ([30] , [31] ). Much of these criticisms are induced by the use of uniform distribution to characterize uncertainty in the presence of incomplete knowledge. Uniform distribution is the best representation of the minimal commitment in the probabilistic representation [32] . As a result, a number of alternative mathematical structures for the representation of epistemic uncertainty have been proposed, including evidence theory, possibility theory and fuzzy set theory ( [33] , [34] ). Evidence theory is a promising alternative that allows a fuller representation of the implications of uncertainty in knowledge than is the case in the probabilistic representation [43] .
In this article, we propose to combine the evidence theory with Bayesian networks to model system reliability. The goal is to obtain a powerful tool to compute the reliability of a system by taking random and epistemic uncertainties into account. The manipulation of these uncertainties by the evidence theory thanks to the appropriate Bayesian network algorithms is presented. The paper shows how exact inference algorithms used by Bayesian networks software tools provide a support to the evidence theory applied to reliability evaluation. In a first section, a simple system that characterizes the drawbacks of standard methods is studied. In section two, principles of the Bayesian network modelling and their application to the reliability analysis are proposed. In section three, basic concepts of the evidence theory and the definition of a possible implementation in Evidential networks are discussed. The last section concerns a comparison of numerical results for the different methods of reliability analysis using the simple case study proposed in the first section in order to show the usefulness of our approach.
Case Study
The case study consists of five components 1 C to 5 C (Fig. 1 Down and are assumed to be independent. The system S is homogeneous and no repairs are considered. Therefore, only the system reliability is discussed in this paper. These assumptions are common in reliability.
Total Probability theorem
In order to solve the computation of the case study system reliability, a formal way through the total probability theorem is investigated. In this method, two structures should be considered according to the state of 5 C . If 5 C =Up , the reliability diagram of the system is shown on Fig. 2 . After the failure of 5 C , the equivalent reliability diagram becomes the one presented on Fig. 3 .
The total probability theorem helps us to write the following equation of the system reliability ( ) 
From (1), the following equation is derived:
Where ( ) t R i is the reliability of component i C at time t .
Fault tree analysis
In this paper we deal with the fault tree in its standard representation. A great number of software packages for fault tree analysis exist; some includes dynamic relations, dependencies between variables and even between branches of the fault tree. These software packages rely generally on specific algorithms that depend on the automatic generation of Markov chains or Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD). In our work, we do not discuss these specific methods and we consider only the basic definitions of the validity of fault trees.
The quantitative fault tree analysis is made in a deductive manner from the top event that corresponds to the undesirable event. By studying the system, the tree on Fig. 4 is built and each minimal cut of the system is found. One observes that the same elementary event may appear several times on the bottom of the tree. Moreover, the repeated events in the
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Fault tree induce dependence between minimal cuts that can induce an estimation error of the system reliability if it is not computed with Binary Decision Diagrams or Markov chain.
State Space Method
First, let us consider the following notations for Markov chains. Let X be a discrete random variable used to model a process with a finite number of mutually exclusive states { }
Assuming that the occurrence of events implies system state transitions from a state at time step (k-1) to another state at time step (k), the process produces a sequence of ) ( k X P , the probability distribution at time (k). This sequence can be modelled as a discrete time Markov chain. Markov chain makes it possible to specify the statistical relationship between states as a transition probability matrix MC P ( ) (
). The Markov chain is considered as homogeneous if the state transition probabilities are time independent. This method leads to a graphical representation ( [4] , pp. 124). In our case study, each component has two states and, system repairs are not considered, and we assume that there will be no more than one failure at a time. Then, Markov chain model is defined over 24 nodes as shown on Fig. 5 and Table 1 .
Moreover, 576 parameters have to be defined to write the transition matrix.
In the case study, the small number of components and their representation as boolean variables led to an acceptable number of states. Nevertheless, in a practical application the number of component is usually more prohibitive resulting in a important number of states. In this situation, the Markov Chain method leads to a combinatory explosion of the number of states and associated parameters.
Bayesian Network Formalism
Bayesian networks are Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) used to represent uncertain knowledge in Artificial Intelligence [37] . A Bayesian network is defined as a couple:
represents the graph; " N " is a set of nodes; " A " is a set of arcs and D represents the set of probability distributions that are associated with each node.
When a node is not a root node, i.e. when it has some parent nodes, the probability distribution is a conditional probability distribution that quantifies the probabilistic dependency between this node and its parents. A discrete random variable X is represented by a node N X ∈ with a finite number of mutually exclusive states
The vector ) ( X P denotes a probability distribution over these states as equation (3):
is the marginal probability of node X being in state In this work, the set D is represented with conditional probability tables. Then, each node has an associated conditional probability table. For instance, in Fig. 6 , nodes X and Y are defined over the sets 1 and 1 .
The conditional probability Various inference algorithms can be used to compute the marginal probabilities for each unobserved node given information on the states of a set of observed nodes. The most classical one relies on the use of a junction tree (see [37] , pp. 76). Inference in Bayesian networks [38] .
and the others are
Fault trees and Bayesian networks to model reliability
The equivalence between Bayesian Networks and the classical fault trees method is described in the following section.
This description is done in the same way as the one in paper [20] and [19] under the hypothesis of fault trees validity, that is events related to components or functions which can only be modelled with binary states.
A fault tree allows to describe the propagation mechanism of the failure in the system. The system reliability or availability is modelled according to the assumption of independence between the events affecting the entities (hypothesis (a), see chapter 7 in [21] ). Whereas a classical model of the parallel structure shown in Fig. 7 is based on a fault tree, the modelling with a Bayesian network is realized with a single 'V structure' as depicted in Fig. 8 (the structure is identical for serial configurations). The conditional probability table (CPT) in (Table 2) contains the conditional probabilities ( )
which explain the failure propagation mechanism through the functional architecture of the system. Therefore, the conditional probability table is defined automatically for an OR/AND gate. 
Bayesian network to model dependent failure modes and uncertain propagations
Bayesian networks provide a powerful mathematical formalism to model complex stochastic processes because this modelling method is based on a DAG model and not a tree. Thus, the hypothesis of independence between events (failures) made for a fault tree is not necessary. Indeed, the Bayesian network allows to compute the exact influence of dependent variables on the system reliability. Moreover, thanks to the conditional probability table, Bayesian networks provide a way to model several failure modes in the system and multistate components.
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The variables are not necessarily boolean therefore it is possible to represent a system composed of entities with several failure modes in a factorized form. Failure Mode Effects Analysis method (FMEA) [6] allows to determine the failure modes associated with a component [22] . Therefore, the states (considered as exhaustive) of a component node are, for instance: Up the component is available, (Table 3) is defined by using the causes and the failure modes of the FMEA analysis. Nevertheless, a
Bayesian network representation can turn out to be useful insofar as a combination of causes (for instance
, and the combination of causes can lead to several failure modes of the function ( 3 S ) [22] . In Table 3 , the uncertainty is represented by the probability distribution (0.2; 0.8).
As it is known in the FMEA analysis, a failure mode can induce other failure modes according to the mechanism of failure propagation through the system. The Bayesian network representation is able to model this propagation but the development of the model has to be rigorously organized [22] .
Case study modelled as a Bayesian network
The hypotheses previously used in the case study are also applicable for the Bayesian network model. The development of the Bayesian network which computes the system reliability is inspired by the fault tree presented on We define a priori probabilities for elementary event i E that imply the probability distribution on the states of component i C (Table 4) as well as conditional probability tables of conjunctive and disjunctive operators (Table 5 and   Table 6 ).
EVIDENCE THEORY FORMALISM
As it can be seen in Tables 5 and 6 , probabilities are given according to component states with respect to the additive
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theorem. This is the strongest constraint of the probability framework. In practice, when probabilities are derived from databases, there is some incomplete information (incompleteness) or some incoherency between data and the reliability model. In these cases, the probabilistic approach is less flexible than the evidence theory [42] because, in fact, incompleteness and inconsistencies express epistemic uncertainty. The evidence theory is, in some sense, similar to the probability theory [43] . It offers a more open formal framework to deal with the problems mentioned previously.
However, there is a lack of industrial tools allowing its implementation, only some toolboxes exist ( [27] , [28] ). Our goal is thus to use the flexibility offered by the evidence theory for the incompleteness and inconsistency problems and to combine it with the modelling power of Bayesian networks for the reliability studies. The following section defines basic concepts and functions to process the epistemic uncertainty on component states to be used in Evidential networks.
The evidence theory (sometimes called belief functions) has been initiated by Dempster with his works on superior and inferior bounds of a family of probability distributions [44] then reinforced by Shafer [45] . Different processing models of imperfect information have thus appeared:
• Upper and lower model [46] • Dempster-Shafer theory and Hint model of Kholas and Monney [47] .
• Transferable belief model ([18] , [48] )
The theory of Dempster-Shafer is a generalized Bayesian model [41] . This property presents a major interest for the applications of the Dempster-Shafer theory by Bayesian networks algorithms. The idea of this theory is to allocate a number between 0 and 1 to indicate a degree of belief on a proposal as in the probability framework. Nevertheless, this allocation is called belief mass M and should not be considered as a probability assignment.
Basic belief assignment
In the Dempster-Shafer theory, the allocation process is called the basic belief assignment. The basic belief assignment follows a similar function as the allocation function of the probability framework. This function is defined by:
[ ]
( )
where Ω is the frame of discernment. Such a function is also called a basic probability structure by Shafer [45] .
The frame Ω is the set of disjoint states or focal elements of M . Thus, the possibility to allocate a quantity to the proposal { } 
Plausibility and belief functions
Once the reliability engineer has defined the basic belief assignment for each component and the network has computed the assignment for each state of the system, we expect to get some information about the system failure probability. In the Dempster Shafer theory, two main functions help us to obtain this information: plausibility and belief functions.
Plausibility function characterizes the degree in which a proposal 
A belief function exists and characterizes the degree in which a proposal 
Property (9) [52] , [54] ,) prefer tackling the problem by defining interval valued probability rather than assigning belief masses. Two reasons make us reject the latter approach. On the one hand, the uncertainty on the state of a component is not expressed in an epistemic manner with an interval. The upper and lower bounds of a probability model an imprecision on the value of the failure probability. It does not define an impossibility to assign an amount of probability to a focal element without introducing more information than it is available. The result is a computation of imprecise probabilities ( [42] , [55] ). Thus, this is a random uncertainty problem rather than an epistemic one. This is why we propose to work with basic belief assignment [48] called the credal level that corresponds to a declarative mode of the real amount of probabilities by the reliability engineers.
Evidential network
Several variables describe in the evidence theory a model of a complex process with epistemic uncertainty. The variables represent components, entities or functions and there exist relations between these variables. The relations define the dependence between variables. Then a description of the problem is presented as a graph defining an Evidential network. Evidential network is a Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG)
, where ( ) network. We propose to use this exact inference algorithm to compute the belief mass propagation in an Evidential network using the Bayesian Network software BayesiaLab©.
Frame of discernment in reliability analysis model
The frame of discernment we used in this reliability analysis is described by the following equations: Currently, reliability engineers extend this framework to multistate components. In this case, the number of combinations in the allocation function M increases and consequently the number of epistemic focal elements increases too. This is a well-known practical problem in evidence theory. Nevertheless, in the case of reliability studies based on databases, basic belief assignments are computed directly from data and this computation mitigates engineers' efforts.
Case study model by Evidential network
The Evidential network is transformed into a DAG with the same structure presented on Fig. 9 . The network propagates basic belief assignments according to conditional belief tables. Assignments of a priori belief mass are initialised as defined in Table 7 to express the basic belief assignment on component 1 C and do not take into account the epistemic uncertainty if the assignment of { } Down Up , is 0. If the expert wants to include an epistemic uncertainty, he/she should define an assignment on the focal element { } Down Up , according to the additive constraint (eq. 6).
In the system studied here, we just use AND or OR gates. So, in order to compute the system reliability, we should model conjunctive and disjunctive operators and integrate them into the Evidential network. These models take into account the particular { } Down Up , focal element into the inference algorithm. The truth tables for a Fault tree were given by Guth in [51] . The failure logic is explained in Tables 8 and 9 where i E define a failure of component i and
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takes the values
As we can see, the main difficulty is to define the relation between { } Table 11 to its equivalent conditional probability table defined in Table 6 .
If the reliability analysis is extended to multistate components but restricted to series and/or parallel connections between subsystems, some efforts should be made to derive the conditional belief tables. For example, if a three-state reasoning is introduced for a subsystem composed of 2 components and the output is also based on three states, the number of parameters for the conditional belief tables will increase to 3 7 . Practically, conditional belief tables are equal to the truth tables of an AND or OR Gates. Thus, only the relation between the basic disjoint focal elements of the inputs (not the epistemic focal elements) should be defined. The relations between all other focal elements were derived directly from De Morgan's laws. However, if the reliability engineer wants to describe some particular propagation mechanisms as shown in sections 3.3, he/she needs to explicitly define all conditional probabilities.
Plausibility and belief functions computation in Evidential networks
To implement the computation of belief and plausibility functions within the Bayesian network tool, we should separate
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the computation in two different nodes ( bel , pls ) as shown on Fig. 10 . This solution allows to relax the additive constraint inherent to Bayesian networks algorithm which does not exist in the general framework of the evidence theory. Table 12 converts eq. (8) from evidence theory to the Bayesian network in order to compute the belief function of the system reliability. This table is a conditional probability table implemented in a belief node of the Bayesian network.
In the same manner, we define Table 13 to compute the plausibility function of system reliability (eq. 7).
As Bayesian Networks respect the additive constraint ( ( )
, we should introduce a NotBelieve focal element (resp. Implausibility) in the ( )
( ) y Reliabilit pls node) to compute the belief function (resp. plausibility function).
Furthermore, we can note that these tables and the network structure can also be used to compute plausibility and belief functions on each component or node in order to give information on probability intervals that bound the real value of the probability for subsystems.
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In order to compare methods mentioned in this paper, we have devoted this section to numerical results. According to the common hypotheses in reliability analysis given in section 2.1, let's define numerical values for failure rates of each component ( we find the system reliability value equal to the one computed by the total probability theorem or the Markov chain. It confirms the exactness of the Bayesian network.
Evidential network, case with no epistemic uncertainty
Let's consider the Evidential network implementing the Dempster Shafer theory and apply it to our numerical study (Fig. 14) . 
Evidential network, case with an epistemic uncertainty
Let's consider the case of an epistemic uncertainty introduced on the state of one component. The propagation of this uncertainty is observed in the Bayesian network (see Fig. 12 ). According to the importance of the component in the system and its uncertainty, the epistemic uncertainty on the system reliability can vary significantly. For example, if the mass of epistemic uncertainty If the basic belief assignment on the system state expresses an epistemic uncertainty then bel and pls measures are not equal and bound the system reliability. Thus, further decision can be made according to this uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, the powerful representation and the exactness of Bayesian networks in reliability studies is shown. In some context like incomplete data in databases or inconsistencies between data and reliability models, we can use a more powerful tool to manage uncertainty in artificial intelligence and approximate reasoning. In the framework of the evidence theory, we recognize a two-level mental model: the credal level where beliefs are held and represented by belief functions and the pignistic level where decisions are made [57] . Many transformation functions can be found: the pignistic transformation defined by Smets [57] or the plausibility transformation [58] . In this paper, we have chosen to work on the credal level only and manipulate the basic belief assignments and their propagation through the use of Bayesian networks inference algorithms. The goal is to help the reliability engineer to handle the epistemic uncertainty of the system state according to the epistemic uncertainty of the state of the components. The belief measure informs the reliability engineer about the worst value of the reliability of the system. The plausibility measure of the system reliability informs the reliability engineer about all possible evidence in favour of the system being reliable. By these two measures the engineer has less precise information but a more credible one.. In an industrial setting, this information is valuable during decision making, where one has to make a compromise between risks and costs.
Moreover, by running diagnostic or intercausal modes of Bayesian networks inference algorithm, the reliability engineer can identify the components which introduce the epistemic uncertainty on the state of the system; and plan all needed inspection accordingly to reduce this uncertainty. This ability of Evidential networks to manage the epistemic uncertainty allows us to investigate, in future works, problems with time dependence like maintenance policies and the implementation to elaborate pignistic decision. Furthermore, the investigation of multistate systems and diagnostic problems with soft evidence can be of great interest for the reliability engineer. In future works, some efforts are to be made for a comparison between standard probabilistic inference of Bayesian networks and belief functions propagation in reliability studies.
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